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COMMUNICATIONS TO CLERGYMEN-
WHEN ARE THEY PRIVILEGED?
FRED L. KUHLMANN*
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago Hollywood made a movie in which Montgomery
Clift played role of a priest who receives the confession of a murderer.
As the plot develops, the priest himself is accused of the murder but
steadfastly refuses to break the seal of confession even when he is con-
victed. He is vindicated only after the murderer's wife breaks under the
strain and reveals the priest's innocence. This was a melodramatic way of
emphasizing the inviolable nature of the sacrament of penance in the
Roman Catholic Church in which confession is obligatory once a year
and the priest is bound, under threat of excommunication, to keep secret
anything communicated to him in the performance of his duties.'
Protestant churches do not place as much emphasis on confession,
but clergy of all denominations have a strong aversion to disclosing
communications which have been made to them in confidence. They have
incurred contempt citations, fines and even imprisonment rather than
testify to such confidences.
In view of their firm feeling on this subject most clergymen would
probably be shocked and alarmed to learn that the law gives them only
limited immunity from testifying. The common understanding among the
clergy is summed up in a recently published handbook of law for pastors.
The author states that if a clergyman is called upon to testify concerning
privileged communications, he should simply state that he is a minister
and that the information solicited was a privileged communication, and
he "will then be excused from answering. "2
Unfortunately, the law is not this dear or definite. Although 44
states and the District of Columbia have statutes recognizing the pri-
vileged nature of communications to the clergy, the wording of these
statutes and the cases construing them leave the clergyman vulnerable in
many situations. Although the statutes enacted in recent years give more
protection than the earlier statutes, there are even limits to the pro-
tection afforded by the more liberally-worded statutes.
* Member of the Missouri Bar, General Cousnel, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. This
article is the result of a study suggested by Mr. Kuhlmann while he was serving as
Chief Counsel for the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod.
1. Specifically, Cannons 889, 890 & 2369.
2. G.S. Jo:.IN, THE MINISTER': LAW HANDBOOK 117 (1962).
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THE LAW IN THE 50 STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The extent of the privilege depends upon the law of the jurisdiction
in which the clergyman is called to testify. This ranges from one extreme
granting no privilege at all to the other where the privilege is broadly
stated. An analysis of the law in the 50 states and the District of Colum-
bia is therefore essential to an understanding of the clergyman-privilege.
States in which there is no privilege
Alabama New Hampshire
Connecticut Texas
Mississippi West Virginia'
In these six states there is no statute recognizing communications
to clergymen as privileged and in the absence of a statute it is generally
accepted that the common law grants no privilege. It follows that clergy-
men in these states must proceed on the assumption that they would be
compelled to testify concerning confessions and other confidential com-
munications. Although there is no case in any of these states in which the
question was directly before the court, there are sufficient judicial pro-
nouncements to support an assumption that there is no clergyman-
privilege.
In the Texas case of Biggers v. State4 the court, as dictum, said:
Texas is without statutory privilege for professional men,
the rule of privileged communications not extending to . . .
clergyman and confessor....
This statement coincides with the views of the authorities on the law of
evidence' and two New Jersey cases which made it clear that in the
absence of a statute granting the privilege the testimony of a clergyman
can be compelled under common law.6 Moreover, there is considerable
dicta to this effect in other state court decisions.7
3. The West Virginia statute grants the privilege only in the justice of the peace
courts. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-10 (1966). Since there is no statute applicable to
courts of record, West Virginia is classified among the states having no statute.
4. 358 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
5. 8 WIcMoRE EVIDENCE § 2394 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Blackstone, in his
classic treatise on the common law, refers only to the attorney-client privilege and
ignores the clergyman privilege. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 789 (Chase ed. 1893).
6. State v. Morehous, 97 N.J.L. 285, 117 A. 296 (1922); Bahrey v. Poniatishin,
95 N.J.L. 128, 112 A. 481 (1921).
7. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 227 S.W.2d 87 (1949) ; In re Swenson,
183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931) ; Le Gore v. Le Gore, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 107 (1963)
(Prior to 1959 in Pennsylvania "there was neither a common law nor a statutory
privilege between clergyman and penitent.") ; McGrogan's Will, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 37
(1961) ("[S]uch a privilege cannot be said to have been recognized as a rule of the
common law either in England or in the United States.") and In re Williams, 269 N.C.
68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967) (Apart from the statute there is no privilege between clergy-
man and communicant).
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The only case recorded under state law in which the privilege was
recognized in the absence of a statute is that of People v. Phillips, the
earliest recorded case on the subject, decided by the Court of General
Sessions for the City of New York.8 (The court consisted of the mayor,
who at that time was DeWitt Clinton, the recorder and two aldermen.)
The court refused to compel a Roman Catholic priest to reveal the identity
of the person who had delivered stolen goods to the priest for return to
the owner. The basis for the court's decision was that "to deprive the
Roman Catholic of his ordinances" would violate the New York consti-
tutional provision guaranteeing freedom of religion. The case has not
been followed in any other decision, and the weight of more recent
authority, previously cited, would indicate that it would probably not be
followed today. Moreover, four years later, in 1817, another New York
court held that the ruling in the Phillips case had to be limited to Roman
Catholic priests (because the Protestant churches did not make confession
a sacrament). This court permitted a Protestant clergyman to testify to
an admission made to him by a prisoner.9
It is unfortunate that a clergyman in Alabama, Connecticut, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, Texas or West Virginia should be confronted
with the difficult task of establishing the privilege which exists in all the
other states by statute. If he refuses to betray a confidence, he runs
considerable risk of being compelled either to pay a fine (or perhaps even
serve a sentence) or appeal the contempt citation to a higher court where
the odds would be against a reversal of the contempt citation. The
clergy in these states are desperately in need of statutes granting the
privilege.
States with limited and questionable privilege
Alaska"°  Maine"s  Oregon2"
Arizona" Michigan 9  South Dakota"
Arkansas 2  Missouri2" Utah2"
Colorado'3  Montana 2  Vermont
9
Hawaii' 4  Nevada 2  Washington" °
Idaho" North Dakota22  Wisconsin"1
Indiana"6  Ohio2" Wyoming 2
Kentucky 7  Oklahoma25
8. The case is reported in 1 WESTERN L.J. 109 and is abstracted from Mr.
Sampson's published Report by P. McGroarty.
9. Christian Smith's Case, 2 N.Y.C. Rec. 77 (1817).
10. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 43 (b)(3). The Alaska Criminal Code makes Rule 43
applicable to criminal cases. ALASKA CrIM. CODE R. 26 (1966).
11. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-1802 (1956).
12. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-606 (1947).
13. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7(4) (1964).
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The first clergyman-privilege statute enacted in the United States
was passed in 1828 by the State of New York and consisted of one
sentence:
No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination
whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made
to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline
enjoined by the rules of practice of such denomination. 3
Inadequate as it is, this statute has served as the model for the 23 states
listed above. For a communication to be privileged under this type of
statute (referred to in this article as the "traditional statute") four tests
must be met:
1. The communication must be made to a clergyman."
2. The communication must be a "confession.""'
3. The confession must be made to the clergyman in his pro-
fessional character.
4. The communication must have been made "in the course of
discipline enjoined by the rules of practice" of the clergyman's
denomination. (Nevada and Vermont, however, omit this re-
quirement.)
The mere statement of these criteria emphasizes the limited scope
14. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 222-20 (1955).
15. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(3) (1967).
16. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1714, 9-1603 (1933).
17. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4) (1963).
18. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.57 (1967). Although this statute was enacted in
1965 and adopts the recommendation of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, it differs little
in substance from the traditional statutes.
19. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27 A. 2156 (1962).
20. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1959).
21. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 13-701-4, 94-8801 (1947).
22. NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.070 (1965).
23. N. D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (1960).
24. OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.02, 2945.41 (1954).
25. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 385; tit. 22, § 702 (1961).
26. ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1967).
27. S. D. CODE § 36.0101 (1960).
28. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-44-2, 78-24-8(3) (1953).
29. VT. STAT. ANN. § 12-1607 (1958). The Vermont statute applies to "statements
made ... under the sanctity of the religious confessional."
30. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1967).
31. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 325.20 (1958).
32. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-139, 7-249 (1957).
33. N.Y. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 72 (1820).
34. Typically, the statutes use one or a combination of the following words:
"clergyman," "priest," "minister of the gospel." The Michigan statute was amended
recently to include " a duly accredited Christian Science practitioner."
35. The Indiana statute also uses the word "admission," but this adds little, if
anything, to the word "confession." IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1714, 9-1603 (1933).
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of the privilege under the traditional statute. When the New York
Legislative Study recently recommended an amendment of the original
1828 statute, it expressed doubt whether the statute had any application
beyond confession to a Catholic priest." Fortunately, the courts have not
been quite so strict in construing the traditional statute, but because of
its narrow wording, many clergymen, including Catholic priests, have
suffered undesirable publicity, anguish, expense and aggravation.
A few cases decided under the traditional statute have offered some
encouragement and support to clergymen, but most of the cases have
denied the privilege. Unfortunately, the cases form no pattern and offer
no constructive guidelines for the clergyman. The court's decision on the
issue of privilege often seems to depend more on the result the court
wants to reach on the substantive issue in the case than on a logical
application of the clergyman-privilege statute. One gets the impression,
which cannot, however, be documented, that where the court wants to
reach a result that can best be attained by exclusion of the clergyman's
testimony, it has interpreted the statute strictly; whereas, in cases where
the clergyman's testimony is needed to reach or fortify the desired result
on the substantive issue, the court has not hesitated to construe the
statute liberally. There is little rhyme or reason to the cases. On the
contrary, a view of the cases demonstrates how uncertain and unpredict-
able the clergyman's position is.
1. Strict versus liberal construction
Only in rare instances has a court bothered to determine whether the
law requires a strict or liberal construction of privilege statutes, and the
courts which have expressly addressed themselves to this question have
disagreed.
The New York Court of Appeals has held that a liberal construction
is necessary to carry out "a long standing public policy to encourage
uninhibited communication between persons standing in a relation of
confidence and trust, such as . . .confessor and clergyman." 7 Similarly,
the Iowa Supreme Court has said that a liberal construction is justified."
On the other hand, a Pennsylvania court has recently held that
"[S]tatutes establishing privilege from testifying are to be construed
strictly. . . ."", and a legal encyclopedia generalizes that "the tendency of
36. See "Practice Commentary" following N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 4505 (McKinney
1963).
37. People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 126 N.E.2d 559 (1955).
38. Allen v. Lindeman, 148 N.W.2d 610 (Iowa 1967); Castner v. Wright, 256 Iowa
638, 127 N.W2d 583 (1964).
39. LeGore v. LeGore, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 107 (1963).
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the courts is toward a strict construction of statutes making communica-
tions to clergymen privileged.","
2. Cases which have upheld the privilege.
There are only five reported cases which have upheld the privilege
under the traditional statute. The landmark case and the one regularly
relied upon by clergymen as their "bible" when claiming the privilege,
is the Minnesota case of In re Swenson,"' decided in 1931, prior to the
enactment of a liberalizing amendment to the Minnesota statute. A Luther-
an minister appealed a contempt citation which arose from his refusal
to testify in a divorce suit. The defendant had come to the parsonage to
talk to his pastor in private and the wife tried to compel the pastor to
reveal what her husband told him on that occasion.
The court had no problem dealing with two of the statutory tests.
(Unquestionably the relator was a clergyman and defendant talked to
him in "his professional character as a clergyman.") The "confession"
and "course of discipline" tests, however, presented a problem.
The court dealt with this problem by divorcing the two concepts and
holding, in effect, that the "confession" (which was defined by the court
as "a penitential acknowledgement to a clergyman of actual or supposed
wrongdoing while seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid or comfort")
contemplated by the statute did not have to be made pursuant to a
denomination's course of discipline. The court therefore concluded that a
voluntary confession qualifies for the privilege in the same manner as one
made under the mandate of a church.2 The court said that if the statute
were limited to confessions which are compulsory, it would be applicable
only to priests of the Roman Catholic church. To reach its result the court
had to relate the "course-of-discipline" test to something other than a
discipline requiring confession; although the court's "reasoning" on this
point leaves something to be desired, the following paragraph from the
opinion associates the "course-of-discipline" test with the duties of the
clergyman:
The statute has a direct reference to the church's "discip-
line" of and for the clergyman and as to his duties as enjoined
by his rules of practice. It is a matter of common knowledge,
and we take judicial notice of the fact, that such "discipline"
is traditionally enjoined upon all clergymen by the practice of
their respective churches. Under such "discipline" enjoined by
40. 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 532 (1948).
41. 183 Minn. 622, 237 N.W. 589 (1931).
42. 237 N.W. at 590.
43. Id. at 591.
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such practice all faithful clergymen render such help to the
spiritually sick and cheerfully offer consolation to suppliants
who come in response to the call of conscience. It is important
that the communication be made in such spirit and within the
course of "discipline", and it is sufficient whether such "dis-
cipline" enjoins the clergyman to receive the communication
or whether it enjoins the other party, if a member of the church,
to deliver the communication.
In a sweeping statement the court held that if a statement is penitential
in character, it is
the duty of the clergyman to hear and advise because such is
in the course of discipline so enjoined by the practice of all
churches. . . . The question is not the truth or merits of the
religious persuasion to which a party belongs nor whether the
particular creed or denomination exacts, requires, or permits a
sacred communication, but the sole question is, as suggested
in Best on Ev. (12th Ed.) Sec. 585, whether the party who
bona fide seeks spiritual advice should be allowed it freely."
The Swenson decision was enthusiastically received by clergymen
(particularly Protestant clergymen) in Minnesota and other states, but
its logic and conclusion are questionable. As a writer in the Minnesota
Law Review" commented shortly after the decision was reported, the
policy of the statute seems to be "the desirability of securing unhampered
the exercise of the religious duty and discipline of confession rather than
any intention to protect all communications of a confidential nature made
to clergymen." The writer concluded that although its "net effect may be
socially desirable," the decision "enlarges the applicability of the statute so
as to give it the effect of rendering privileged all penitent confessions
made by parishioners to their clergymen regardless of whether they are
made in the discharge of a positive religious duty or voluntarily for the
purpose of securing solace." In any event, the Swenson case has been cited
by other courts'" and by clergymen.0 interested in upholding the
privilege.
It is significant that the Minnesota court is the only court that has
44. Id.
45. 16 MINN. L. REv. 105 (1931).
46. See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Vir. 1958) and Kohloff v.
Bronx Savings Bank, 37 Misc. 2d 27, 233 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Civ. Ct, City of N.Y. 1962).
47. W. H. TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 93-95 (1964). The author rather
optimistically says that since this decision, "the courts have had little doubt that where
the proper statute and confessional acts exist, penitential communications made to clergy
of any denomination are privileged." Id. at 95.
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faced the issue and attempted to reason through to its conclusion. In the
other four cases in which the privilege has been upheld, the court has
done little more than state its conclusion.
In Krugilov v. Krugilov s (a New York case decided before the
New York statute was liberalized) a rabbi who was a "spiritual leader"
of a Jewish Center was consulted by a husband and wife concerning their
marital difficulties. The court, without bothering to support its decision
with citations of authority or any reasoning, simply held that what was
said by the parties in the rabbi's study was stamped "with that seal of
confidence which the parties in such a situation would feel no occasion
to exact."4
In Kohloff v. Bronx Savings Bank 0 the court held that a confession
to a priest was privileged even though the penitent was not a member of
the church, citing dictum in the Swenson case to the effect that a peni-
tential confession is privileged "though made by a person not a member
of the particular church or of any church."'"
In Vickers v. Stoneman,5" an early case decided under the Michigan
statute, the court upheld the privilege in a slander case where a minister
"drew forth" from defendant statements of a transaction while trying to
interest him in religious matters during the course of a revival.
In Dehler v. State ex rel Bierck"3 the court, in a bastardy proceeding,
without relating any of the background evidence, summarily held that the
testimony of a priest was properly excluded "because the facts inquired
of him were communicated to him . . . as a privileged communication."
The court's conclusions of fact were that the priest was "there" (the
place is not revealed) as a priest of the Catholic Church, the other party
was a communicant of that church, and her conversation was with him
in his capacity as a priest. The court made no reference to the "confes-
sion" or "course-of-discipline" tests.
These are the only recorded cases under the traditional statute in
which the clergyman was excused from testifying-not the sort of
judicial record to give encouragement to clergymen living in the 23
states which retain these archaic statutes, especially when there are
48. 29 Misc. 2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1961), appeal dismissed, 226
N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962).
49. The court quoted from a letter received from the New York Board of Rabbis
to the effect that it was deemed essential for the proper work of a rabbi that any con-
fidence reposed on him by husband or wife or anyone else who has come to him for
counseling not be divulged. This was apparently considered as satisfying the "course of
discipline" test which at that time still in the New York statute. 29 Misc. 2d at 18,
217 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
50. 37 Misc. 2d 27, 233 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1962).
51. 237 N.W. 589, at 591.
52. 73 Mich. 419 (1889).
53. 22 Ind. App. 383, 53 N.E. 850 (1899).
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numerous cases decided under these statutes in which the clergyman was
permitted or compelled to testify.
3. Cases which deny the privilege
The courts have denied the privilege under the traditional statute
for a number of reasons. It is not always possible to pinpoint the specific
reason underlying an opinion, but, generally speaking, the cases fall into
seven categories.
a. Communication not a "confession." Six cases hinge primarily
on the non-confessional nature of the statement made to the clergyman.5"
With one exception these cases simply hold that the statement in question
was not a confession, and do not attempt to define the term. In Knight v.
Lee, an old Indiana case, the court said:
The confessions, concerning which clergymen are incompetent
to testify, are, evidently, such as are penitential in their char-
acter, or as are made to clergymen in obedience to some sup-
posed religious duty or obligation, and do not embrace com-
munications to clergymen, however confidential, when not made
in connection with or in discharge of some supposed religious
duty or obligation.5
The Indiana court held that for the statement to be a confession under
the wording of the traditional statute, it must be made in the discharge of
a religious duty. This distinguishes the Indiana decision from the
holding in the Swenson case where the Minnesota court held that a
statement could be voluntary and still qualify as a confession within the
meaning of the statute.
b. Individual not a minister. The opinion in Knight v. Lee was in
part based on the fact that the person to whom the statement was made
was an elder and a deacon-not a pastor-in the Disciples of Christ
54. Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881) (Defendant called plaintiff a "whore" while
being questioned by an elder and deacon who were investigating charges pending in the
Christian Church against plaintiff.) ; Angleton v. Angleton, 84 Idaho 184, 370 P.2d 788
(1962) (In a divorce and child custody proceeding statements were made to a priest
"during conversations in the course of friendly meetings.") ; In re Koellen's Estate,
162 Kan. 395, 176 P.2d 544 (1947) (suit, brought prior to the liberalizing amendment of
the Kansas statute, involving the validity of a will in which a priest was held competent
to testify concerning a statement made by the decedent that he had only one will and that
it was in his home) ; Gillooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182 (1877) (practically no informatiork
is given in the opinion) ; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 221 S.W.2d 87 (1949)
(The defendant accused of murder admitted to a Methodist minister who voluntarily
visited him in jail that he lost his temper and killed the man) ; Commonwealth v. Gallo,
275 Mass. 320, 175 N.E. 718 (1931) (A statement made to a priest by a convicted
murderer implicating a third person who also participated in the crime, was not a con-
fession).
55. 80 Ind. at 203-04.
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Church, and was therefore not acting in the capacity of a clergyman when
the conversation took place.56 The status of a Salvation Army Major was
left undecided in a New Jersey case because the court held that even if he
were held to be a clergyman, there would be no privilege in the absence of
a statute."1 Confessions made to "members" of a church have been held
not privileged even though all church members were under a duty to
confess their faults to each other."
c. Clergyman not acting in professional capacity. Four cases turn
primarily on the fact that the clergyman was not acting in his professional
capacity. None of the cases establishes any important principle, but in
each it is clear that the professional character of the clergyman was not
involved.59
d. Not in course of discipline of clergyman's church. Several
cases have denied the privilege because the statements were not
made in the course of discipline of the clergyman's denomination. In
State v. Andrews" a Baptist minister was permitted to testify after he
had stated that there was no course of discipline in the Baptist church by
which a member was enjoined to confess his sins to a minister of that
church. In Alford v. Johnson"' the court held the conversations which a
man had with a Methodist minister (whose church he had expressed a
desire to join) concerning adulterous relations with a woman who was
alleged to have exerted undue influence on him, were not made in the
course of discipline enjoined by rules of practice of the Methodist
Church. Another case involving the Methodist Church is Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 2 in which a pastor of that denomination voluntarily
visited an accused murderer in jail; the court said that the statements
56. 80 Ind. at 203. Cf. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917)(Elders of the Presbyterian Church are ministers of the gospel because no power of
discipline is conferred on the pastor except in conjunction with ruling elders).
57. State v. Morehous, 97 N.J.L. 285, 117 A. 296 (1922).
58. Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (1818).
59. Partridge v. Partridge, 220 Mo. 321, 119 S.W. 415 (1909) (A priest acting as
a notary public drew a deed and was held competent to testify concerning the contents
of the instrument); People v. Gates, 26 N.Y. Corn. I- Rep. 311 (1835) (Clergyman
was permitted to testify to an admission made to him by the defendant in a fraud case
because the clergyman himself testified that the communication was not made to him as
a clergyman) ; Colbert v. State, 125 Wis. 423, 104 N.W. 61 (1905) (In a criminal
action for arson a Catholic priest was held not to have acted in his professional character
when he received an anonymous letter from the defendant and then persuaded her to
write another note to prove that the handwriting was the same) ; Milburn v. Haworth,
47 Colo. 593, 108 P.155 (1910) (The statement in question was made by defendant in a
fraud case to four members of his church including the minister).
60. 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739 (1960). The case, however, was decided on the
principle that the privilege, if it existed at all, was waived by being communicated to
third parties.
61. 103 Ark. 236, 146 S.W. 516 (1912).
62. 310 Ky. 557, 221 S.W.2d 87 (1949).
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made by the defendant on that occasion were in no way connected with
the discipline of the church.
In Sherman v. State" a man was accused of the rape of his own
daughter. He had written a letter to his preacher requesting prayer on his
behalf. The letter contained certain statements which had "some tendency
towards an indirect confession of the charge." The court was obviously
not sympathetic toward the defendant, and permitted the preacher to
testify. The court held that the mere fact that a confession is made to a
minister of the gospel to obtain his help is not sufficient to exclude the
confession. The confession, it was held, must also be pursuant to a duty
enjoined by the rules of practice of the particular church-and the court
could find no evidence that there was any rule of practice of the defen-
dant's church (unnamed in the case) which enjoined upon its members
the duty to make confessions of sins.
In each of these cases the court in effect held that when the tradi-
tional statute refers to "the course of discipline enjoined by a church" it
means a course of discipline requiring confession of sins. Admittedly, the
wording of the statute is somewhat ambiguous, but this interpretation
would seem to be more accurate and realistic than that espoused by the
court in the Swenson case, where the course-of-discipline test was
equated with a duty enjoined on a clergyman to counsel with his
parishioners. As was stated by a writer in the Kansas Bar Association
Journal:
Even in those churches where some form of confession is
practiced it is normally a voluntary practice, and there is serious
question whether it amounts to a "decipline enjoined by the
church."6"
e. Penitent not a member of church. Contrary to dictum in the
Swenson 5 case and the holding of the court in the Kohloff"6 case, there
are cases in which the court has either held or as dictum has stated that
for the privilege to be asserted, the communication made to a clergyman
must be by a member of his church."7
f. Observations made by clergyman during course of conversation.
What a clergyman observed while being consulted in his professional
capacity has been admitted as evidence even though the oral communica-
tions themselves may be privileged. In an early California case 8 it was
63. 170 Ark. 148, 279 S.W. 353 (1926).
64. Blaes, Penitent Privilege Under the New Code, 33 KAN. B. J. 279 (1964).
65. See note 51 supr.
66. See note 50 supra.
67. State v. Morgan, 196 Mo. 177, 95 S.W. 402 (1906); Mitsunaga v. People, 54
Colo. 102, 129 P. 241 (1913); Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881).
68. In re Toomes 54 Cal. 509 (1880).
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held that the traditional statute in effect at that time did not cover a
preliminary examination made by a priest to determine whether a dying
woman was in a proper frame of mind to make a confession, and that the
priest thus could testify concerning her mental condition. In a more
recent case the Appellate Court of Indiana ruled that a Lutheran institu-
tional chaplain should have been permitted to testify to the soundness of
mind of a grantor at the time of a conveyance, because such testimony
concerned neither a confession nor an admission on the part of the
grantor.6" The fact that part of a clergyman's testimony related to
personal observations was also a factor in a Pennsylvania court's opinion
admitting the clergyman's testimony in a case involving a husband's claim
to a share in his deceased wife's estate.7"
There is dictum in an Iowa case7' to the effect that observations
made by a clergyman are as privileged as communications, but the court
gave no reason and cited no authority for this broad statement, and it is
submitted that there is little justification for it. It could be argued that the
person who consults his clergyman does not want his state of mind
testified to any more than he wants the content of his conversation
revealed. However, the advancement of truth in such situations would
seem to outweigh the rather incidental violation of trust and confidence
which is involved in permitting a clergyman to testify concerning his
observations.
g. Clergyman acting as marriage counselor. One of the most signi-
ficant decisions under the traditional statute is the California case of
Simrin v. Simrin.72 (At the time of the decision in 1965 the traditional
statute was still in effect in California, but later in the year the statute
was amended to broaden the scope of the privilege.) A rabbi, whom both
spouses had consulted in an attempt to salvage their marriage, was called
as a witness in a subsequent divorce proceeding. The court held that the
traditional statute did not apply to communications made to a spiritual
advisor acting as a marriage counselor because the statute was limited
to confessions in the ordinary course of discipline enjoined by the church.
It would wrench the language of the statute to hold that
it applies to communications made to a religious or spiritual
advisor acting as a marriage counselor. We think this result
regrettable for reasons of public policy . . . but the wording
of the statute leaves us no choice.7"
69. Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950).
70. In re Schaeffer's Estate, 52 Pa. Dauphin Co. Rep. 45 (1941).
71. Byles v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822, 6 N.W.2d 401 (1942).
72. 43 Cal. Rep. 376 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
73. 43 Cal. Rep. at 378-79. The court, however, proceeded to find a theory upon
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Similarly, a Pennsylvania court held that a pastor could be called to
testify about his efforts to effect a reconciliation between husband and
wife."' Although this case was decided before Pennsylvania had a
statute, the court did not rely on the proposition that no privilege
existed under the common law, but based its decision on a finding that
the statements were not made to the pastor in his professional character
while seeking spiritual advice.
The cumulative weight of the cases denying the privilege
emphasizes the inadequacies of the traditional statute and the importance
of liberalizing the statutory language to make the privilege more mean-
ingful in today's society.
Jurisdictions which have broadened the privilege
California Louisiana New York
Delaware Maryland North Carolina
District of Columbia Massachusetts Pennsylvania
Florida Minnesota Rhode Island
Georgia Nebraska South Carolina
Illinois New Jersey Tennessee
Iowa New Mexico Virginia
Kansas
In the rest of the states and in the District of Columbia the privilege
extended to clergymen is phrased more realistically. In most of these
jurisdictions the statutes have been enacted after 1958. Because the
language in these statutes varies considerably, it is difficult to generalize.
Suffice it to say that they all (1) broaden the privilege to cover more than
confessions and (2) either eliminate the course-of-discipline test or clearly
relate it to a duty on the part of a clergyman to counsel with his paris-
hioners and to keep the communications secret. The following paragraphs
contain the core of each of these statutes and the date in parenthesis is
the year the liberal wording first appeared in the statute:
California75 (1965, operative January 1, 1967)
Communications made in confidence to a clergyman
who, in the course of the discipline or practice of his
church is authorized or accustomed to hear such com-
which the rabbi could be excused from testifying. The court noted that before the rabbi
undertook the counseling program he had exacted an express agreement from both
spouses to the effect that he would not be called upon to testify in the event his recon-
ciliation efforts failed and a divorce action was brought. The court held that this
agreement precluded the parties from calling him as a witness.
74. In re Schaeffer's Estate, 52 Pa. Dauphin Co. Rep. 45 (1941).
75. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-33 (Deering 1966).
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munications and, under the discipline or tenets of his
church has a duty to keep such communications secret.
Delaware"8 (1961) and
District of Columbia77 (1961)
Confessions and communications in the course of giv-
ing religious or spiritual advice and communications
made by either spouse in connection with any effort to
reconcile estranged spouses.
Florida (1959)
Information communicated to a clergyman in a con-
fidential manner and necessary to enable him to dis-
charge the functions of his office according to the usual
course of his practice or discipline, wherein such person
so communicating such information about himself or
another is seeking spiritual counsel and advice relative
to or growing out of the information so imparted.
Georgia9 (1951)
Every communication made by any person professing
religious faith, or seeking spiritual comfort.
Illinois" (1961)
Confessions and any information which has been
obtained by a clergyman in his professional character
as spiritual advisor.
Iowas' ( 1888 or earlier)
Any confidential communication properly entrusted to
a clergyman in his professional capacity and proper to
enable him to discharge the functions of his office
according to the usual course of practice or discipline.
Kansas8 (1963)
Any communication which the "penitent"'8 intends
shall be kept secret or confidential and which per-
76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4317 (1966).
77. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1967).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.241 (1960).
79. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1954).
80. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.1 (1965).
81. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 622.10, 782.1 (1966). This statute dates from at least 1888.
82 KAN. CIV. PRO. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-402, -429 (Vernon 1965).
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tains to advice or assistance in determining or dis-
charging the penitent's moral obligations or to obtain-
ing God's mercy or forgiveness for past culpable
conduct.
Louisiana"' (1928) (apparently applicable only to criminal cases)
Any communication made to a clergyman in confid-
ence by one seeking his spiritual advice or consolation,
or any information that he may have gotten by reason
of such communication.
Maryland5 (1957)
Any confession or communication made in confidence
by one seeking spiritual advice or consolation.
Massachusetts8 (1962)
Confessions and any communication made by any
person in seeking religious or spiritual advice or com-
fort, or as to a clergyman's advice given thereon in
the course of his professional duties or in his pro-
fessional character.
Minnesota" (1931)
Confessions and any communication made by any
person seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid or
comfort.
Nebraska s ( 1893 or earlier)
Confessions and any confidential communication pro-
perly entrusted to a clergyman in his professional
capacity and necesary and proper to enable him to dis-
charge the functions of his office according to the
usual course of practice or discipline.
New Jersey9 (1947)
A confession or other confidential communication
83. The word "penitent" is defined as "a person who recognizes the existence and
authority of God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of
religion advice or assistance in determining or discharging his moral obligations, or in
obtaining God's mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct."
84. LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. §§ 15-477 to -478 (West 1959).
85. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 13 (1957).
86. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (1966).
87. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (1947).
88. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1201, -1206 (1943). This same wording appears in
Nzn. CoMP. STAT. 899 (1893).
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-23 (1967).
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made to a clergyman in his professional character, or
as a spiritual advisor in the course of the discipline or
practice of the religious body to which he belongs or
of the religion which he professes.
New Mexico"° (1933)
Any confession or disclosure made to a clergyman in
his professional character.
New York"' (1965)
A confession or confidence made to a clergyman in
his professional character as spiritual advisor.
North Carolina"2 (1959)
Any information which may have been confidentially
communicated to a clergyman in his professional
capacity under such circumstances that to disclose the
information would violate a sacred or moral trust;
that the presiding judge in any trial may compel dis-
closure of such information if in his opinion it is
necessary to a proper administration of justice.
Pennsylvania" (1959)
Information acquired by a clergyman in the course
of his duties from any person secretly and in con-
fidence.
Rhode Island" (1960)
Confessions and any confidential communication pro-
perly entrusted to a clergyman in his professional cap-
acity and necessary and proper to enable him to dis-
charge the functions of his office in the usual course
of practice or discipline.
South, Carolina95 (1959)
Any confidential communication properly entrusted to
a clergyman in his professional capacity and necessary
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12 (1953).
91. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 4505 (McKinney 1966); N.Y. CRIM. PRuc. CODE
§ 392 (McKinney 1958).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-17-23 (1967).
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 331 (1966 Supp.).
94. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-17-23 (1966 Supp.).
95. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-409 (1962).
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and proper to enable him to discharge the functions
of his office according to the usual course of practice
or discipline of his church or religious body.
Tennessee6 (1959) and
Virginia97 (1962) (apparently applicable only to civil cases)
Any information communicated to a clergyman in a
confidential manner, properly entrusted to him in
his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him
to discharge the functions of his office according to
the usual course of his practice or discipline, wherein
such person so communicating such information about
himself or another is seeking spiritual counsel and
advice relative to and growing out of the information
so imparted.
In addition to the word "confession" or in substitution therefor
these statutes use more encompasing words such as "communications,"
"information," "confidential communication," "disclosure," or "confi-
dence." And when the course-of-discipline concept is retained in
the statute, as previously indicated, it is clearly identified with a
discipline concerning itself with the functions and duties of the
clergyman rather than with a discipline requiring confession. These two
changes, when combined, produce an algebraic rather than an arithmetic
improvement in the clergyman's position.
Other interesting and distinctive features of the more recently
enacted statutes include (1) better definitions of those who qualify as
clergymen,98 (2) extensions of the privilege to quasi-legal proceedings,9"
(3) criminal sanction against a clergyman who discloses the communica-
tion,' and (4) provisions specifically covering marriage counseling.1°1
It would be a mistake, however, for clergymen to assume that these
liberally worded statutes give them complete protection. In fact, the
majority of the reported cases decided under the liberal wording of these
statutes deny the privilege.
96 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-109 (1967 Supp.).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-289.2 (1950).
98. See, e.g., the statutes of California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.
99. See, e.g., the statutes of Illinois, Pennsylvania and South Carolina.
100. Tennessee makes violation a misdemeanor and subjects the clergyman to a $50
fine and imprisonment in the county jail or workhouse for not exceeding six months.
101. See the statutes of Delaware and the District of Columbia.
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1. Cases in which the privilege was upheld
In Cimijotti v. Paulsen1°2 the Iowa statute was held to cover
corroborating statements made to a priest by two friends of a penitent
when ,such statements were necessary to obtain the approval of the
Catholic church for separate maintenance and divorce proceedings. How-
ever, the case is one in which the court was obviously interested in
upholding the privilege because it was completely unsympathetic with the
plaintiff's efforts to prove a conspiracy among two former wives and a
third person to publish defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff.
In LeGore v. LeGore °3 a man enlisted a clergyman's help in
seeking a reconciliation with his wife. During the course of the con-
versation he admitted that he had been unfaithful. In a divorce proceed-
ing the wife subpoenaed the clergyman and the trial court admitted his
testimony. The appellate court said that under the new statute in
Pennsylvania, the trial court erred in admitting the testimony because
"marriage counselling seeking to preserve the sanctity of marriage is
most important and i's definitely within the functions and duties of a
minister." The fact that the husband was not a member of the clergy-
man's church made no difference.
2. Cases in which clergymen were permitted or compelled to testify
The Iowa Supreme Court has denied the privilege in three cases. In
the earliest of these the defendant in a rape case met a clergyman at a
railway station and gave his account of the occurrence. The court held
that these statements were not of a confidential nature, and were not
told for the purpose of obtaining the clergyman's advice or assistance.'0 '
The conversation which followed this recounting of the facts, however,
was held privileged for the stated reason that during the subsequent
conversation the defendant asked the clergyman for spiritual assistance.
One gets the impression that the court felt the defendant should have
been convicted and therefore distinguished between the two parts of the
conversation in order to admit as testimony that portion of the discussion
which was needed to sustain the conviction.
In the second case the Iowa court held that the minister was acting
as a friend and interpreter (in connection with the negotiation of a
settlement in a personal injury case) and that what was 'said had nothing
to do with spiritual matters."0 And in the latest case' (decided in
102. 219 F. Supp. 621 (D.C. Iowa 1963), affd 340 F.2d 613. The case was in the
Federal court by reason of diversity of citizenship, but the Iowa statute governed.
103. 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 107 (1963).
104. State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 64 N.W. 277 (1895).
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1967) the Iowa court compelled a clergyman to produce certain letters as
evidence in an alienation of affection suit. The letters had been found by
the defendant's wife in the defendant's home and had been delivered by
her to her pastor for safekeeping. The court said it was dealing with an
independent document and not a direct communication, and that if such
evidence were to be excluded, justice could be thwarted simply by
delivering important papers to a clergyman. 07
In a recent Pennsylvania case... involving a will contest, a state-
ment made by a woman to her priest-who came to her home prior to her
death to receive a gift-to the effect that she had no will, was held not to
constitute a privileged communication. The court said that the statement
may have been made "in the course of the priest's duties," but that it
was in no sense made secretly or in confidence to a spiritual adviser from
whom the woman was seeking either spiritual advice or absolution.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that no privilege attached to
a request made by a defendant (charged with bigamy) to his rector to
intercede for him with his first wife for a settlement of the criminal
proceedings. The defendant wrote out the points he wanted the rector to
bring before his wife. The court concluded that the statements were not
made "under such circumstances as to imply that they should forever
remain a secret in the breast of the confidential adviser."' 109
Similarly, in a Minnesota case decided after the 1931 amendment of
the Minnesota statute, the court held that there was nothing penitential or
confidential in a communication made by a girl to her pastor when he
called on her at the hospital and she related to him what happened when a
train accident occurred. The court held that although the pastor had
called on the girl prepared to give spiritual advice or comfort, none was
asked."'
An interesting and important opinion has recently been handed
down in the case of In re Williams."' This Case involved a Baptist
minister who has been held in contempt and sentenced to ten days in jail
for refusing to be sworn as a witness in a rape case. The trial judge had
carefully and patiently explained to the minister that he would sustain ob-
jections properly entered to questions requiring disclosure of confidential
communications. Nevertheless, the minister refused to be sworn as a wit-
ness and to testify that he had seen the prosecuting witness at the defen-
dant's home. (Both the defendant and the prosecuting witness were mem-
106. Allen v. Lindeman, 148 N.W.2d 610 (Iowa 1967).
107. 148 N.W.2d at 615.
108. McGrogan's Will, 26 Pa. D. & C. Rep.2d 37 (1961).
109. Hills v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N.W. 836 (1901).
110 Christensen v. Pestorius, 189 Minn. 548, 250 N.W. 363 (1933).
111. 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967).
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bers of the minsiter's church and, as the minister expressed it, he did not
want "to take sides.") Neither the prosecutor nor the defendant's attorney
intended to object to this testimony, but the minister took the position
that it would violate his moral duty as a Christian minister to take the
witness stand and testify to any matters within his knowledge concerning
the matter on trial. The Supreme Court of North Carolina was unim-
pressed with this position and concluded that the minister's refusal to take
the stand was wilful, deliberate, unlawful and punishable summarily. It
held that contempt does not have to proceed from a malevolent spirit:
The fact that one called as a witness fears that his testi-
mony may decrease the esteem in which he is held in the com-
munity, or may decrease his ability to render service therein,
does not justify refusal by him to testify in response to questions
otherwise proper.... It is the right to exercise one's religion or
lack of it, which is [constitutionally] protected, not one's sense
of ethics." 2
The court went on to say that the freedom to exercise one's religious
belief is not absolute (citing precedents where polygamy and compulsory
vaccination were at issue) 1. and that "the 'compelling interest' of the
state in the rendering of a just judgment in accordance with its law
overrides the incidental infringement upon the religious belief of the
witness that for him to testify is wrong.""' The court verbally chastised
the minister with the following statement:
History, both sacred and secular, ancient and modern, is
replete with accounts of men of noble character and lofty
motives who have suffered punishment far more severe than
ten days in jail for conscience's sake. History, especially in
recent times, also records that the respect and acclaim which
have been accorded these heroes of faith, both spiritual and
political, have sometimes induced the self-seeking charlatan to
follow in their footsteps-so long as the probable penalty does
not outweigh the anticipated applause." 5
The Williams case indicates that the courts today are not always
sympathetic with the clergyman's point of view, particularly where the
circumstances indicate that the clergyman may be stretching a point.
In summary, a review of the cases decided under the liberal statutes
suggests that even in the states where such statutes have been enacted
112. 152 S.E.2d at 324, 325.
113. Id. at 326.
114. Id. at 327.
115. Id. at 323.
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the clergyman cannot blindly assume that he is protected by a privilege
and that he must use good judgment both at the time he is being consulted
and when he is called as a witness.
3. The Privilege in the Federal Courts
The status of the clergyman-privilege in Federal courts is uncertain.
If it exists at all, it is difficult to say how far it extends. There is no
Federal statute on the matter and the Federal Rules of Civil1 and of
Criminal.. Procedure do not deal specifically with the subject. There
are, however, two Federal cases which recognize the privilege.
The first Federal court pronouncement on the subject was the
following dictum in a district decision:
Under the law of the United States, privileged communications
are strictly limited to a few well-defined categories, such as
communications between ... clergyman and penitent... 18
It would be interesting to know how the court reached this unqualified
and positive conclusion-but no authority is cited and no reasons are
given.
A more meaningful case is that of Mullen v. United States,"9
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in 1958, prior to the enactment of the statute for the District of
Columbia. A mother was convicted for chaining her children to a bed.
(She claimed that she had to take this action to protect them when she
had to leave the house.) Disturbed by what she had done ihe went to her
pastor (Lutheran) and made a penitential disclosure to him so that she
could receive communion. The court held that the communication was
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 43 insofar as pertinent provides as follows:
Rule 43. Evidence
(a) Form and Admissibility. All evidence shall be admitted which is
admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of
evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing
of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general
jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held. In any case,
the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the
evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient method prescribed
in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency
of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner.
117. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 provides as follows:
Rule 26. Evidence
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
unless otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The
admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall
be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide,
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
118. United States v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1953).
119. 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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privileged even in the absence of a Federal statute. It reviewed the
history of the privilege under common law and concluded that although
the privilege was not recognized in the English courts after the Restora-
tion, "judicial decisions and legal writings were not uniformly hostile to
the privilege.""12 The opinion cites Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,121 which provides that the competency of witnesses
shall be governed "by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience." The opinion then concludes that in a situation where
"reason and experience call for recognition of a privilege which has the
effect of restricting evidence, the dead hand of the common law will not
restrain such recognition."' 22 The court apparently regarded Rule 26 as
a license to depart from the common law rule of no-privilege.
Whether other Federal courts will follow this interpretation, whether
they will follow it in civil cases, and under what circumstances they will
recognize the privilege, are all unanswerable questions at this time.
The Basic Principles Involved
The subject of clergyman-privilege is not unlike many other legal
problems. There are a number of considerations which bear upon the
question and they do not all lead to the same conclusion. This problem
is complicated not only by legal and sociological factors which are in
tension with each other, but also by the presence of somewhat tenuous
spiritual and psychological concepts.
To grant the privilege involves the suppression of evidence, and since
rules of evidence are designed to promote the successful development of
truth with a view toward attaining a just result, the judicial process is
thwarted to the extent that evidence of this nature is made inadmissible.
Some of the proponents of this line of reasoning would not only deny the
privilege, but would go one step farther and compel a clergyman to
volunteer information. For example, a Catholic priest in West Germany
has been subjected to much criticism for not having disclosed to the
authorities that a 16-year-old butcher's apprentice had confessed a mur-
der. The priest had urged the boy to give himself up to the police, but
instead, the boy committed three more murders.'
On the other hand, there is the point of view that a confidence should
be respected, particularly by a person who is in a position of trust and
confidence-a doctor, lawyer or clergyman. This is supported by the
120. Id. at 27.8
121. See note 119 supra.
122. 263 F.2d at 279.
123. Parade Magazine, Feb. 11, 1968, at 27.
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spiritual argument that a man must have the opportunity to "get right
with his God" and be assured of his forgiveness. Psychologists recognize
the therapeutic value of the confession and clergymen emphasize its
spiritual significance. The clergy insists that unless these confidences are
safeguarded, people who need spiritual assistance will be hesitant to seek
it, and society will suffer.
In balance, the advantages of granting the privilege seem to out-
weigh the disadvantages. And doubts in the matter can be resolved, at
least in large measure, by reasoning that if the privilege did not exist, it
is likely that the communication would not take place at all. If such
communications were to "dry up," what has society gained? It has been
argued that in such event man's "compulsion to, confess" would lead him
to the authorities rather than to a clergyman, thereby promoting the
cause of justice." 4 Even if this were valid psychological reasoning, it
seems to border on the inhuman to remove a safe outlet for the "com-
pulsion to confess" in order to force a man to incriminate himself. There
can be little doubt that the privilege will work injustices, some minor,
some serious; but if the privilege did not exist and if people were aware
that it did not exist, it is likely that the evidence in question would never
come into being.
The following excerpt from the court's opinion in the Mullen case
sums it up:
The benefit of preserving these confidences inviolate over-
balances the possible benefit of permitting litigation to prosper
at the expense of the tranquility of the home, the integrity of
the professional relationship, and the spiritual rehabilitation of a
penitent. The rules of evidence have always been concerned not
only with truth but with the manner of its ascertainment. 25
A SUGGESTED FORM OF STATUTE
Whether the conclusion reached in the preceding segment of this
article is correct or whether the reader agrees with it is to a large extent
academic. The fact is that the lawmakers in 44 states and the District of
Columbia-whether from genuine belief in the value of the privilege or
from pressure from churchbodies and their clergy-have not only adopted
the concept of clergyman-privilege but have in recent years, as previously
indicated, been extending its scope. Fifteen states".8 in the past decade
have either enacted statutes for the first time or have liberalized statutes
124. 21 N.Y.S. Bar Bull. 288 (1949).
125. 263 F.2d at 280
126. The 14 states listed under the liberal category plus Maine which is listed as
having the traditional form of statute.
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which had been on their books. Clergyman-privilege has become part of
the law of evidence.
The practical problem therefore is establishing the privilege on as
sound a basis as possible so that it will accomplish its purposes without
being abused and furnish to clergymen reasonably definite guidelines to
rely upon as they perform their ministry.
Most states have a long way to go to achieve this objective. Deter-
rents to progress in the legislative area are (1) the volume of legislation
presented at each session of a state legislature, (2) the tediousness and
intricacies of the legislative process and (3) the narrow application of a
clergyman-privilege statute. In a number of instances it has required an
embarrassing case to stimulate legislation. When a clergyman has been
fined or threatened with imprisonment and the religious community and
the press have been aroused by the clergyman's plight, state legislatures
have reacted swiftly and have enacted legislation which is more charged
with emotionalism than with good draftsmanship. 2 '
It would be presumptuous to try to frame a "model" statute, because
reasonable men will undoubtedly differ on the proper wording of a
clergyman-privilege statute-differ not only in prescribing the extent of
the privilege, but also in defining the term "clergyman" and describing
the various forums or stituations in which the privilege can be asserted.
A useful purpose might be served, however, by framing a statute which
could be used at least as a starting point by anyone interested in formulat-
ing a statute on this subject.
The provisions embodied in the "Model Code of Evidence" adopted
by the American Law Institute 28 in 1942 and subsequently incorporated
in the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence, have been adopted in only
one state (Maine)."' The fact that the wording of the Model Code has
not been generally accepted is probably due to the fact that the provision
is really nothing more than an elaborate restatement of the traditional
statute and reflects little original thinking on the subject.
127. There are a number of instances of this type of emergency action. The
Delaware statute was enacted in 1961 to come to the rescue of an Episcopal rector sub-
poenaed in an alienation of affection suit. Reese, Confidential Communications to the
Clergy, 24 OHIo ST. L. J. 55 (1963). The New York statute was enacted shortly after a
New York court in the Smith case had denied to a Protestant minister the privilege
which had previously been granted to a Catholic priest. See text accompanying notes
8-9 supra. In Tennessee the enactment of the statute followed the imposition of a fine on
a Baptist minister who refused to divulge private information obtained from a married
couple prior to a divorce case. W. H. TIEMAN, THE RIGHT TO SILENcE, 25 (1964).
The liberalized Minnesota statute was directly attributable to the litigation in the
Swenson case, and the California statute was charged in the same year that the Simrin
case was decided.
128. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE, Rule 219 (1942).
129. See note 18 supra.
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Fortunately some of the recently-enacted state statutes evidence
more thoughtful and careful draftsmanship, and using the better provi-
sions of these statutes as a base, the author suggests the following form
of clergyman-privilege statute.
Section - . Communications with Clergymen
(a) If any person shall communicate with a clergyman in
his professional capacity and in a confidential manner (i) to
make a confession, (ii) to seek spirtitual counsel or comfort or
(iii) to enlist help in connection with a martial problem,
either such person or the clergyman shall have the privilege,
in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding, to refuse to disclose
and to prevent the other party from disclosing anything said
by either party during such communication.
(b) For the purpose of this section
(i) the word "clergyman" shall mean any duly or-
dained, licensed or commissioned priest, minister, rabbi or prac-
tioner of any established church or religious organization; ex-
cluding, however, any person who is self-ordained or who does
not regularly, as a vocation, devote his time and abilities to the
service of his respective church or religious organization, and
(ii) the term "legal or quasi-legal proceeding" shall
mean any proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court of law
whether or not a court of record), a grand jury investigation, a
coroner's inquest, a hearing in the state legislature or any com-
mittee thereof, and any proceeding or hearing before any public
officer or administrative agency of the state or any political
subdivision thereof.
In support of these suggested provisions the author offers the
following comments:
General Comment
The provisions are as broad as any statute in effect. The intent is to
encourage communications with clergymen on the presupposition that
they benefit the individual and society. In the author's view the pro-
visions meet the four requirements which Wigmore said should be met
before a privilege is granted :10
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed;
130. 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parities;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
With respect to paragraph (a)
1. The provision is applicable to "any person." There is no
requirement that the person communicating to the clergyman be a
member of the clergyman's church or denomination. Nor is there any
requirement that he have religious faith or a belief in God. He may be
consulting the clergyman in search of such faith or to rediscover it.
2. The communication must be to a clergyman "in his professional
capacity." Communications made to a clergyman-even though made in
confidence-as a friend or acquaintance in the course of a private dis-
cussion which is not related to his duties as a clergyman would not be
privileged.
3. The communication must be made "in a confidential manner."
If the surrounding circumstances indicate that there was no intention
that the subject of the discussion be kept secret, there would be no
privilege. For example, if others are present when the discussion occurs,
no privilege would attach to such discussion.
4. The "confession" contemplated by the statute may be either an
act enjoined by the discipline of a denomination or a voluntary confession.
5. The type of communication which is privileged extends beyond a
confession to statements made in the course of spiritual or marital
counseling.
6. The privilege covers statements made by the clergyman as well
as those made by the other party. The statutes of most states give
protection only to what is said by the penitent; but the clegryman, in
counseling with the person who has come to him for advice, should be
free to express himself without fear that he may be subpoenaed to testify
concerning his own statements. The privilege should cover the entire
conversation between the parties.
7. The privilege may be claimed by either party to the discussion.
Most statutes today speak only in terms of the clergyman being incom-
petent to testify or in terms of the inadmissibility of the clergyman's
testimony. Nothing is said expressly about the testimony of the other
party. This might be explained by the fact that the older statutes seemed
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to contemplate only confessions of a criminal act and it was assumed that
the other party would not be a witness. Although existing statutes would
probably be interpreted to apply also to the testimony of the other party,
this should not be left to the uncertain processes of judicial construction.
It should be stated clearly in the statute.
8. Either party may claim the privilege even though the other may
be willing to waive it. Thus, if a husband consult a clergyman with
regard to a marital difficulty and learns from the clergyman certain facts
which he subsequently would like to introduce into evidence in a divorce
proceeding, the clergyman should be in a position to prevent a breach of
the confidence. Moreover, if either party dies, the other could nevertheless
claim the privilege if he feels that under all the circumstances it is
advisable to do so. However, it is clearly a matter of privilege and either
or both parties could testify if neither party claims the privilege.
9. The proposed statute would apply only to "communications."
Observations made by the clergyman of the other party's mental com-
petence or physical appearance would not be covered by the privilege.
Nor would the clergyman be excused from disclosing or producing objects
entrusted to his care. In such situations it is submitted that the fourth
criterion established by Professor Wigmore would not be satisfied.
Moreover, this would seem to go beyond the spiritual or therapeutic
area in which consultation with a clergyman could reasonably be expected
to help the individual; instead, it would afford a procedure for the abuse
of the legal process.'
With respect to paragraph (b) (i)
The definition of "clergyman" is intended to encompass all persons
generally considered as clergymen and to exclude persons who may be
considered clergymen only by a particular sect as well as elders, deacons
and other church officers. What takes place at church trials can hardly be
considered secret or confidential, and no privilege would be extended to
those who conduct such trials. Laymen would certainly be excluded, even
though a particular denomination proclaims the priesthood of believers,
and even though the denomination exhorts its members to confess their
sins to one another.
With respect to paragraph (b) (ii)
If the concept of clergyman-privilege is valid at all, there is no
reason why it should not be extended to all types of legal and quasi-legal
proceedings. Unless this is done, the privilege could become a trap--
protecting the parties in a court of record but leaving them vulnerable in
131. Allen v. Lindeman, 148 N.W.2d 610 (Iowa, 1967).
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the mushrooming area of committee hearings and other quasi-legal
proceedings.
Concluding Comment about Suggested Statute
The statute does not attempt to spell out a procedure to be followed
in determining whether the privilege should be granted. A court or
hearing officer would have to determine whether
1. the communication was made to a clergyman
2. in his professional capacity and
3. in a confidential manner
4. to make a confession, to seek spiritual counsel or to enlist
help in connection with a marital problem.
In most instances, the determination of whether these four elements are
present would present no problem. It would be naive, however, to suppose
that all questions could be resolved easily. There will undoubtedly be
borderline situations in which the application of one or more of the four
tests will be difficult; but the hope is that under this type of statute
they will be minimized, and that the statute will provide clear guidelines
in the great majority of factual situations which can reasonably be
expected to arise in the normal course of events. Moreover, nothing is
said concerning a trial judge's right to inquire into the content of the
communication. In most instances there would be no need to go this far
because the judge could determine the availability of the privilege from
the surrounding circumstances; but there would be nothing to prevent a
judge from inquiring into the substance of the communication in order
to determine whether the privilege should be recognized.
The above comments concerning the proposed statute set forth the
reasoning underlying the various provisions. This reasoning is the product
of some study of the subject and a limited exposure to the practical
problems. It can certainly be improved upon by others who have given or
will give this subject thought and attention. The important point is that
there is a real need for a statute of this general nature in the majority of
states. Whether this suggested form is enacted "as is" or with variations,
some strengthening and clarification of the clergyman's presently pre-
carious and vulnerable position is not only desirable but necessary.
MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE PARSONAGE
A useful purpose is served by discussing and recommending needed
improvements in statutes on the subject of clergyman-privilege. But the
fact remains that-particularly in those few states which as yet have no
statute, to a large extent in those states which have only the narrowly-
worded traditional statute, and to a limited degree even in those states
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which have liberalized the language of their statutes-the clergyman is
faced with serious problems. The following practical suggestions and
comments are offered for consideration by clergymen and lawyers who
advise them concerning their legal rights and duties in this sensitive area.
1. Since the majority of states still require that the confession or
other communication be made to a clergyman in the course of the dis-
cipline practiced by his particular denomination, those church bodies
whose course of discipline in this, area has not been clearly enunciated
should take such action as may be necessary or advisable, consistent with
their theology and polity, to make it clear that their clergymen have an
obligation to hear confessions and other communications, to give spiritual
advice and to keep such matters secret. To the extent that the theology
or doctrine of a particular church-body permits, the status of the con-
fession should be spelled out with recognition of the fact that the greater
the degree of duty imposed on a member to confess his sins, the greater
will be the privilege-protection. Most church bodies have done nothing
to bolster the position of their clergymen, and those which have addressed
themselves to this problem, 3' in most instances have not given it careful
study or attention. Although course-of-diiscipline statements are des-
perately needed, the numerous denominational differences in theology and
church procedures make it impossible to draft a course-of-discipline
statement which would be generally acceptable.
2. The clergyman should make certain that any discussion as to
which privilege may be asserted at a later date is made under circumstances
designed to protect its confidential nature. This means that it must take
place outside the hearing of a third person. There have been some cases
holding that a communication to a doctor made in the presence of a nurse
or to an attorney in the presence of a law clerk remains confidential
because of the close working relationship which exists between the third
person and the doctor or attorney. This reasoning may be held to apply
to a vicar, an assistant pastor, or even an elder or deacon who may be
requested by the clergyman to "sit in" on the meeting; but to be on the
safe side, it is best to have no one else present during the discussion. To
make a record of the conversation in a written memorandum or on tape
might joepardize its secrecy. Talking about the matter with anyone after
the discussion has taken place will also destroy the privilege.
3. If the clergyman is consulted by both spouses concerning marital
difficulites and if the situation permits, it would be advisable to ask
132. W. H. TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 27 (1964) (Baptist), 28 (Presby-
terian, but limited to Presbytery of Newark, N.J.), 51 (Mo. Synod Lutheran citing only
Walther's Pastoral Theology), 52 (Lutheran Church in America and American Lutheran
Church). In the Roman Catholic church the protection is built in by reason of the
sacramental aspect of the confession. See note 1 supra.
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husband and wife to sign a simple statement to the effect that if their
problems cannot be resolved and a divorce proceeding ensures, neither of
them will call the clergyman as a witness. Although there is a well-
accepted rule of law that agreements to suppress evidence, including
agreements not to appear as a witness, are contrary to public policy and
are therefore invalid, 33 when both parties to the litigation have pre-
viously agreed not to call as a witness the clergyman whom they jointly
consulted, there would seem to be no violation of public policy. This
procedure was approved in the Simrin case; the court there said that the
public policy to preserve marriages prevails over the policy opposing the
suppression of evidence.'
4. When the clergyman has reason to believe that the communica-
tion may not be privileged, he should forewarn the other person and per-
mit him to decide whether to continue the discussion. The clergyman
should also be circumspect in his own statements during the course of
such a conversation.
5. A clergyman should not let himself be used as a depository for
objects which another person, for some reason, does not want to retain
in his possession. The concept of privileged communications does not
include serving as custodian of property. What the clergyman should do
(in terms of reporting the incident or revealing the identity of the party)
if an object has been submitted to him for safe-keeping, is a matter which
would have to be discussed with an attorney. The circumstances vary too
greatly for general advice to be of any value.
6. A clergyman should be thoroughly conversant with the wording
of the statute (if there is a statute) in his state, and, if possible, should
consult with a lawyer concerning the degree of the protection which such
statute affords. Being informed concerning the scope of the privilege, the
clergyman, guided by his own conscience, can make more intelligent de-
cisions concerning his exposure to a contempt citation if he refuses to
testify. The lawyer could also advise him of the consequences of refusing
to testify in a situation in which there is no privilege. This usually
involves a contempt citation (generally without a hearing or trial) with
whatever punishment (fine and/or imprisonment) attaches to a contempt
proceeding in a particular state.
7. Where possible, efforts should be organized by clergymen on an
inter-faith basis to obtain the enactment of more meaningful legislation
than presently exists in most ,states.
8. A final observation is that clergymen should at all times remem-
ber that they are citizens as well as clergymen, and that they must be as
133. 17 AM. JUR.2d Contracts § 198 (1964).
134. See accompanying note 73 supra.
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objective as possible in weighing their responsibilities in both capacities.
The privilege which they enjoy is one which should be exercised wisely
and not abused. One writer has suggested that one of the motives prompt-
ing the extension of the clergyman-privilege is "a feeling of individual
and professional pride and self-importance in being the inviolable
respository of others' secrets" and that this feeling, "fanned by inter-pro-
fessional jealousies and pretensions, is very likely not the least reason for
the continued and considerable agitation for extension of the privilege to
other fields."' 85 This is a cynical statement, but clergymen, as well as
lawyers, doctors and other professional people, must determine for them-
selves whether there is any truth in it. There may be other ulterior
motives for not wanting to testify. For one thing, it is usually not easy
or pleasant to testify in a case, to be exposed to publicity and
possibly criticism, and perhaps to take sides when parishioners a:e
involved. And there are times when a clergyman has made statements in
the course of a conversation which, after more mature reflection, he
realizes would be embarrassing to him if brought to light in court. In all
such situations a clergyman may be tempted to invoke the privilege in
order to rationalize or disguise a personal reason for not wanting to
testify.
The Book which most clergymen regard as their supreme authority
puts it very succinctly:
To everything there is a season .... a time to keep silence,
and a time to speak.3 8
135. 21 N.Y.S. Bar Bull. 288, 290 (1949).
136. Eccles. 3:1, 7.
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